ABSTRACT Collaboration formation has been on the increase among software development firms due to rapid advancement in technology, requirements for diverse skills, and fierce competition. By collaborating with a suitable partner, a firm can benefit from its diversified skills, utilize its experience, share costs, and reduce the product completion span. As a result, a better quality product that offers more profits can be developed. However, forming an alliance with an inappropriate partner or an unfair profit and cost distribution mechanism may result in failure. The existing mechanisms offer poor results either due to inappropriate partner selection criteria or due to unfair profit distribution because of the bargaining power advantage to one of the negotiating firms. To address the aforementioned issues in the criteria for partner selection and profit sharing, this paper formulates the strategic interaction between firms for the partner selection and profit sharing as a Shapley value-based cooperative game theoretic model. Our model enables a firm to not only select a suitable partner but also offer a fair profit distribution mechanism. Our cooperative game model takes into account the knowledge investment, stock of knowledge, knowledge absorption capacity, coordination cost, and development cost of firms. The model is analyzed with various scenarios under which collaboration formation occurs and provides different strategies regarding collaboration such as not collaboration (NC) and collaboration (C). The proposed model provides a better joint payoff as well as a higher and fair share of the joint profit for each firm.
I. INTRODUCTION
New technology and knowledge give firms a competitive edge and ensure profit in software industry. However, software technology is not only diverse but is evolving continuously. Considering this rapid advancement in technology and always increasing customer expectations, it is sometimes difficult for a firm to generate desired profits and meet customer expectations with the limited resources and knowledge available to the firm. Therefore, forming alliance with a feasible partner is one of the ways to keep in touch with diverse new technologies and complementarity resources [1] .
Strategic alliance can be defined as ''collaborative efforts between two or more firms in which the firms pool their
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resources to achieve mutually compatible goals that they could not achieve easily alone'' [2] . Reasons behind cooperation of firms towards forming alliance can be: to access new markets, gain knowledge, share risks, technology innovation, improve process performance, quality, productivity or maximize profit [3] - [7] . Selecting a suitable partner for new alliance is of major concern because selecting inappropriate one may result in alliance failure [8] ; a recent survey shows that around 60 percent of alliances fails as a result of selecting an unsuitable partner [8] . On the other hand, selecting a suitable partner for alliance results in a successful collaboration [9] - [11] .
There are various criteria for selecting a partner for alliance and they vary depending upon the nature of the alliance projects and collaborative objectives of the firms [12] , [13] . One of the key criteria is how firms in alliance share profit.
It plays a vital role in enabling them to reach over an agreement in order to develop a successful collaboration [13] - [16] . Numerous collaboration formation techniques between firms are available in the literature which take into account diverse variables including profit sharing such as Nash Bargaining and Stackelberg game [13] , [16] , [17] . Although, these techniques provide a platform for the collaboration formation between firms based on maximization of the profit, but they ignore its fair distribution between them based on their individual contributions to the alliance. This might be due to the existence of bargaining power that gives advantage to a partner firm taking first action. Such techniques may result in unrealistic profit sharing as a result of which firms may never collaborate or it may result in failure or dissatisfaction.
To overcome the aforementioned limitations in the literature, we propose a cooperative game theoretic model for the selection of a partner firm based on the fair profit share to the collaborating partners. Our work enhances the noncooperative game theoretic model proposed in [13] that provides a decision support system to project managers to select an appropriate partner for forming collaboration and enables them to reach over a revenue sharing agreement. However, the said model results in the generation of a lesser overall payoff and also its distribution to firms is unfair. Due to the bargaining advantage problem, the firm which initiates the negotiation first gets a higher payoff share which may cause dissatisfaction to the other partner firm. Contrarily, our Shapley value based cooperative game model provides a better profit distribution mechanism between two firms based on their contribution to the alliance rather than bargaining over profit ratio agreements. Furthermore, the proposed model shall help the project managers to decide whether to collaborate with another firm for product development or do so individually without collaboration.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the partner selection and revenue sharing criteria available in literature. Next, the proposed model for a two-player collaboration is presented in the section 3. Afterwards, we evaluate the performance of our model extensively via simulations on various scenarios in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes this work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents an overview of the literature on collaboration formation among firms in different industrial domains. As discussed in the previous section, despite their numerous advantages, many alliances fail due to the selection of an inappropriate partner or an unfair profit sharing agreement. There are two major concerns related to forming collaboration the overview of which we provide in this section: 1) selecting an appropriate partner firm, and 2) a fair profit allocation agreement between partners for successful collaboration.
We classify collaboration formation literature into two categories: 1) one-way partner selection and 2) two-way partner selection approaches as shown in the table 1.
A. ONE-WAY PARTNER SELECTION
One-way partner selection techniques enable a firm to rank a list of potential partners based only on its own perspective and choose a best partner for itself. These techniques ignore whether this firm itself is an ideal partner for the best ranked firm or not as a result of which the collaboration may never form between firms proposed by such one-way partner selection algorithms or may fail.
Several such techniques have been proposed in various industrial contexts [18] , [19] . Büyüközkan et al. use fuzzy techniques, IF-AHP and IF-TOPSIS for weighting criteria and ranking partners to select an appropriate one in the logistic supply chain [18] . Similarly, Awasthi et al. use Gray Rational Analysis techniques with BOCR framework methods for ranking and selecting a strategic alliance partner in the logistic value chain [19] . These techniques can be helpful in ranking partners in the multi-criteria situations. However, these techniques depend on the experience of users; lack of expertise or non-serious evaluation of criteria by them may influence end results.
Furthermore, the Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) technique is used to evaluate and select an appropriate partner in the green innovation projects [20] and the ship design industry [21] to help project managers. However, as the data gets complicated, visual representation by these techniques becomes more difficult. Wu and Barnes [22] , [24] and Sari [23] utilize fuzzy set theory for partner selection in agile supply chain considering vague and imprecise information about other partners. These approaches can be used in highly demanding situations, but again, increase in criteria enhances complexity.
All the above-mentioned techniques are good for weighing evaluation criteria and ranking partners for a single firm; one firm ranks a list of candidates, and selects the best suitable partner for its self. However, such a collaboration may not form in reality or may fail; a one-way partner selection algorithm suggesting to a firm A another firm B as a best potential partner without considering priorities of B, does not necessarily imply B will consider A as best partner as well.
B. TWO-WAY PARTNER SELECTION
These techniques take into consideration objectives of both the firms while ranking and suggesting suitable partners. They enable a partner selecting firm A to rank potential partner firms while also considering whether A itself is a suitable partner from their perspective as well or not based on their objectives. As a result, the collaborations formed based on such two-way partner selection techniques are more realistic and have higher chances to successfully complete projects and enhance the profit of partner firms.
Rezaei [4] proposes a two-way partner selection model for supply chain industry where supplier and buyers evaluate each other and select a single appropriate partner for collaboration. This resolves the issue of evaluating firms from both the perspectives. However, these studies still neglect the effect of profit sharing among collaborating firms which is one of the most important criteria in alliance formation.
Several game theoretic techniques have been proposed for the distribution of profit among firms in various contexts. These game theoretic techniques are considered two-way partner selection approaches where firms evaluate each other for collaboration formation. Mafakheri and Nasiri applied Stackelberg leader-follower game for finding equilibrium revenue sharing decision between consumer and retailer to achieve better performance [27] . Although, this work provides balanced revenue sharing practices, but the model depends on the post collaboration data which restricts it utilization prior to the first time collaboration. Similarly, Song and Gao [15] applied Stackelberg game, centralized game model and bargaining game model in the green supply chain industry and analyzed the behavior of manufacturer and retailer under different revenue sharing agreements. The revenue sharing agreement provided by this work can increase the overall greening level of product and also increase the total profit. Furthermore, Aust et al. [28] focus on the distribution of cost, effort and profit among firms in management accounting perspective. The study provides equilibrium strategy for the cost, effort and profit. This study also suggests that the equal distribution of profit increases research effort and collaborative profit. However, this study does not provide any clear evidence about whether to form an alliance or not.
In the context of collaborative product development, Arsenyan et al. [13] propose a Nash bargaining model to find the optimal level of collaboration, coordination cost and revenue sharing ratio among the focal and partner firms. This model can help the project managers to decide whether to collaborate or not, and also to calculate the revenue sharing ratio. On the downside, it has a bargaining power problem because the firm which takes actions first while negotiating gets more payoff resulting in its unfair distribution.
As discussed above, the existing literature addresses the issue of profit sharing among firms while forming alliance. However, the existing techniques on collaboration formation and profit sharing are limited as they address only alliance between two firms. Furthermore, existing techniques have bargaining power problem because a firm taking action first while negotiating has the advantage of getting more profit compared to another firm, resulting in unfair payoff distribution.
Contributions of this Work: To address limitations of bargaining power and the unfair distribution of payoff among two or more firms, we formulate the strategic interaction between them for collaboration formation and payoff sharing as a cooperative game using Shapley value approach [29] . Shapley value is proven to be effective for fair distribution of profit among firms based on their individual contributions to the alliance. This model provides firms an equal distribution of power while deciding the profit sharing ratio among themselves. In addition, the proposed model enables firms to decide whether to collaboratively develop a product or not, which helps in selecting a suitable partner for collaboration formation. We extend the Nash bargaining model proposed by Arsenyan et al. [13] , which helps project managers in collaboration formation decision among firms considering factors such as firms knowledge stocks, level of collaboration formation, coordination costs sharing ratio and revenue sharing ratio. We adopt the factors and the scenarios provided by model proposed in [13] , and then propose cooperative game model based on Shapley value approach to distribute profit fairly among two or more firms and eliminate bargaining power. As a result, not only the alliance generates more profit but the payoff distribution to firms is also fair. Next, we present the proposed cooperative collaboration formation game.
III. COLLABORATION FORMATION BETWEEN TWO PLAYERS
In this section, a mathematical model is presented to provide support for firms on decision of collaboration formation. We consider collaboration formation among two firms namely focal (f ) and partner (p). Firms collaborate to maximize their profit. Therefore, in this work we consider the profit sharing as a basis for collaboration formation decision. However, profit that each firm gets from collaboration, is the outcome of level of collaboration (θ ) and coordination cost ratio (C) that each firm contributes. In this work, it is supposed that both f and p firms will jointly put their efforts in developing a product [16] . Moreover, we adopt the validated assumptions of literature and industrial experts to provide basis for our work.
Assumption 1: Developing a product in collaboration provides added value to the product [16] . Firms may achieve higher profit if they develop product collaboratively.
Assumption 2: Firms bear collaboration cost when developing a product collaboratively. The collaboration cost is due to coordination efforts, knowledge spill over and the addition money spent of integration of work that is distributed among firms [16] . In order to maximize profit, firms chose optimal level of information sharing parameter. The optimal level of the knowledge sharing depends on the nature of the projects [30] . However in this work, we model the collaboration among non-competitor firms as considered in [13] .
Assumption 3: Developing product in collaboration reduces overall development cost in comparison to when a firm develops product individually without collaboration [16] . In this work, we consider the scenarios where firms develop product individually and also when develop product in collaboration.
Taking in consideration the above assumptions, we construct our model step by step. First, we calculate payoffs for case when two firms develop a product individually in section III-A. Then, we explain the model proposed by [13] for calculating payoffs to firms when they develop a product collaboratively in the section III-B. Subsequently, we propose our cooperative game model in section III-C by extending the non-cooperative game model proposed in [13] . We formulate the strategic interaction for collaboration formation and profit VOLUME 7, 2019 sharing between firms f and p as a cooperative game. We calculate the total payoff generated as a result of developing product cooperatively in collaboration. Finally, we calculate the payoff share that each firm playing cooperative game gets using Shapley value approach.
Here, we provide an overview of the steps mentioned above, however, detail description of the steps is provided later in the section. In the first step, we derive the payoff equations π
, of f and p firms respectively when they develop a product individually without collaboration, by considered the model proposed in [13] , where the firms develop product collaboratively. A firm j uses its stock of knowledge k j i to add value to the product and decrease its development cost (DC) in relation to i type of knowledge; j in k j i represents a firm f or p. The payoff equation for both f and p depends on the product value a firm creates and the DC that it will bear while developing it.
In the second step, we calculate the payoffs, π f C i and π p C i , for firms f and p respectively when they develop a product collaboratively as proposed by [13] . The stock of knowledge k j i in collaborative product development depends not only on the knowledge investment KI j i by the firms, but also on their learning. In collaborative product development, the stock of knowledge k f i and k p i of both f and p is utilized while developing a product. Therefore, we calculate the pooled stock of knowledge k i as the sum of knowledge stocks of both the firms. This pooled stock of knowledge k i is further used to add value to the product and decrease the DC. The final payoff function to the firms f and p while developing a product collaboratively consists of the value added to the product by them in relation to the pooled stock of knowledge k i , the coordination cost ratio (C) due to collaboration and the DC of each firm.
In the third step, we introduce some new notations to rewrite the payoff functions of both the firms f and p in a compact way when they develop a product individually without collaboration and also when they develop it in collaboration. In the fourth step, we use these compact payoff functions for the firms f and p when they develop a product collaboratively (π
). The joint payoff function consists of the overall product value generated by both the firms and the coordination cost (C) they have to pay for the collaboration. Furthermore, the joint payoff function considers the DC of both f and p.
In the final step, we consider the joint payoff function for deciding the share of the profit for each firm that is ∅ f for f and ∅ p for p using Shapley value approach. The final payoff share that each firm gets from the alliance is then used by them to decide whether to form collaboration or not. Notations used in this paper are given in the Table 2 .
A. PAYOFFS WHEN FIRMS DEVELOP A PRODUCT INDIVIDUALLY
In accordance with Cowan et al. [31] , in this work we assume that a firm j possesses N distinct types of knowledge, and its stock of knowledge k j i depends on both its knowledge investment KI j i and the knowledge absorbed γ i while collaborating with another firm [32] . However, when a firm j develops a product individually, its stock of knowledge is the result of its own investment only. Therefore, we model the stock of knowledge for a firm j when it acts individually and develops a product on its own without collaboration as below
where k j i represents the stock of knowledge for a firm j in i type of knowledge, where j represents the firm f or p. KI j i represents the investment of firm j in i type of knowledge. The knowledge stock of a firm depends only on its investment in i type of knowledge. A firm can use its knowledge stock for creating product value, and it also affects its development cost. Therefore, the total payoff to the firms f and p when they individually develop a product in relation to their own knowledge stock and development cost becomes [13] :
And
where π
and π
represent the payoff to the firms f and p respectively for individually developing the product with no collaboration NC. The knowledge stock of a firm effects the product value as increase in the stock of knowledge adds more value to the product. However, there will still be uncertainty VOLUME 7, 2019 about quality of the developed product. Literature refers to this type of uncertainty as transitional uncertainty (v) [16] . Therefore, yk j iṽ will be the final value added to the product in relation to stock and knowledge k j i and the efficacyṽ. The value of v ranges from 0 to 1. A firm faces less uncertainty in developing a product with the increase in the value v. The cost born by a firm is its own investment KI j i in i type of knowledge and the DC in relation with knowledge stock k j i . The total expected payoff for the firms f and p in the i type of knowledge when each one individually develops the product will be:
B. PAYOFFS WHEN FIRMS DECIDE COLLABORATION IN A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME [13] As our model is an extension of a non-cooperative partner selection game proposed in [13] , therefore, we explain its details here first before proposing our cooperative game model. When firms collaborate, their stock of knowledge not only depends on their own investment but also on what they learn from the collaborating partner that is the knowledge spill over or shared by another firm [13] , [32] . It is to be noted that the stock of knowledge for the firm j while in collaboration with the firm j is a concave function of collaboration and is defined as [13] :
The stock of knowledge of the firm j depends on both: a) its own investment KI j i , and b) what it learns from the partner j . Learning function depends on the level of collaboration θ and absorption capacity γ j of the firm j. Collaboration level θ indicates the amount of information sharing, hence a high collaboration level indicates higher learning in the i type of knowledge considering high absorption capacity γ j . The absorption capacity γ j is a function of firms own investment KI j i and the knowledge complementarity β. Knowledge complementarity can be defined as the amount of difference in knowledge of both firms j and j [13] . Learning function also depends on the trust of firm j on j. Therefore, trust j j represents the trust of a firm j on j. Hence, a higher value of trust denotes that knowledge investment KI j i will be more revealed [13] . From eq-6, the learning for the firm j becomes:
Therefore, the Co-learning L i for both the firm f and p in the collaboration can be then expressed as [13] :
The pooled stock of knowledge k i of the firms depends on the knowledge investment that each partner adds to the collaboration and also on their learning. Therefore, the pooled knowledge for the alliance will be the sum of the knowledge investment and the total learning of both the firms f and p as shown below.
The pooled stock of knowledge can be utilized while developing a product collaboratively. A firm working individually without collaboration gets all the revenue and bear its development cost itself. Whereas in an alliance, firms form a collaboration in such a way that ∅ is the amount of revenue share ratio the focal firm f gets, whereas, 1 − ∅ is the amount of share received by the partner firm p. Collaboration incurs coordination cost which is shared by both the partners. If we denote by C the coordination cost ratio born by p, then, 1 − C is the cost born by f . Higher stock of knowledge decreases development cost for a firm, as less resources are utilized when firms have high stock of knowledge. Despite high stock of knowledge, development cost always exists hence (DC j i ) takes finite positive values [13] . The payoff functions for both f and p firms are concave as the cost functions are convex. Therefore, based on the reasoning and in accordance with [13] , the total expected profit of the focal firm f and the partner p in collaboration then becomes:
In the above equations, π f C i and π p C i represent individual payoffs to the focal and partner firms respectively when they collaborate (C). Where s(θ) is the coordination cost function due to collaboration among firms; higher level of collaboration means higher coordination cost due to more intense interactions and information sharing. In the collaborative product development, the contribution in terms of high knowledge investment or high coordination cost sharing ratio by a firm does not necessarily mean that it will get a high profit [13] .
Writing payoff equations in a compact way: Higher absorption capacity of a firm ensures more learning from the partner firm. The absorption function is the combination of the firm's own investment and the knowledge complementarity between the two partners. It can be expressed as
, where j can refer to both f or p. The development cost is assumed to be linear and increasing and is modeled as DC j − DCDR j (KI j + θ L j ) [13] . Similarly, the development cost for a firm j without collaboration will be DC j − DCDR j KI j . Writing the eq-5 in a compact way for focal and partner firms when they develop a product without collaboration, we get following equations for both the firms.
where
Similarly, we get the following equations for the individual payoffs to the focal and partner firms when they jointly develop a product after writing eq-10 and eq-11 in a compact way:
And (15) where
The step-wise simplification of these equations is presented in the appendix A. Eq-14 and eq-15 are expected payoffs for the firms f and p when they develop a product collaboratively [13] . Next, we use these compact payoff equations of the firms f and p to formulate total payoff of the collaboration when firms interact in a cooperative game and calculate their payoff share using the Shapley value approach.
C. COOPERATIVE GAME MODEL
Cooperative game theory is a well-known mathematical modeling tool for formulating, analyzing and solving strategic interaction situations. Cooperative game theory can help project managers in selecting appropriate partner firms to develop products collaboratively in order to increase profit or to decrease development cost [33] . In cooperative game, a firm may only form coalition if it gets better payoff compared to the payoff when it develops the same product individually [34] . In this section, we first calculate the total payoff generated by the alliance when both the firms play a cooperative game in section III-C.1. Next, we calculate payoff share for each firm based on its individual contributions to the project using Shapley value approach in section III-C.2.
1) PAYOFF OF ALLIANCE WHEN FIRMS DEVELOP PRODUCT IN COOPERATIVE GAME
Instead of individual utility function we will focus on the joint profit of the firms as considered in [28] . That is forming coalition of both focal and partner firm and considering their payoffs as single coalition profit to maximize overall alliance profit. Therefore by adding the individual profit of collaborating firms, the total profit of the coalition can be then written as:
Putting the payoff of both the firms in the above equation, we get
The individual share of revenue is ∅ for focal firm and 1−∅ for partner firm but in the joint profit function we can assume the total revenue ∅ = 1 since the sum of revenue ratio of both firms will be equal to 1. Similarly, the sum of coordination cost ratio of both firms will be 1. So, by putting revenue ∅ value as 1 and coordination cost ratio C value as 1 in above equation we get following simplified equation for the profit of the coalition of focal and partner firms
The total profit (π tot C i ) is a concave function, as the sum of two concave functions (equations 14 and 15) results in a concave function [35] . In the next step, we will find the optimal level of collaboration that will be beneficial for firms and both firms will agree to in order to achieve higher collaborative profit. For the optimal level of collaboration we take the first order derivative of the joint utility function and set it equal to zero.
Solving the above equation for the optimal θ , we get:
By putting the above equation in the total coalition payoff function, we get the following equation which represents the total payoff generated when the firms develop a produce in coalition:
We have now calculated the totally payoff that will be generated as a result of the coalition. Next, we calculate the payoff share that the two firms should get based on the Shapley value based approach. 
2) PAYOFF SHARE OF EACH FIRM USING SHAPLEY VALUE
From the equation-21, we get the total payoff of the alliance when firms play a cooperative game. It is then distributed among firms using the Shapley value based on the marginal contribution of each of them. As in our collaborative game, we considered two firms f and p, therefore in accordance with [36] , our game in characteristic form is a pair of (N , v), where N = (f , p) is a set of firms and v is a function of possible coalitions; v = 2 N → R. Let ∅ be the profit function, then ∅ j (v) can be interpreted as the value of j th player in the game v. As proposed in [36] , in order to have a unique Shapley value [37] payoff division, the payoff function ∅ must satisfy three conditions for the given set of inputs. These three conditions are of: 1) symmetry, 2) Dummy players and 3) additivity which our collaboration formation game satisfies.
The Shapley value equation for ∀j ∈ N is defined as follows: (22) where |N |! denotes the possible ordering of the firms. However, |S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)! are the number of ways to order a player that are picked ahead of player j in a set S. Whereas, [v(S ∪ {j}) − v(s)] is the marginal contribution by the player j to the coalition S. As we discussed earlier that ∅ j denotes the value of j th player in coalition, where in our case, the j th firm is f and p. The game between f and p is superadditive and is defined as; A game
With this in mind, the Shapley value of the firm f firm will be calculated as follows:
By simplifying the above equation, we get the payoff f will receive:
Similarly, the payoff ∅ p for the firm p is as follows:
Eq-24 and 25 represent the profit share that each firm will get from the coalition. This model provides a decision support system to the project managers to select suitable partner firms for collaboration based on the fair distribution of payoffs. Furthermore, the model provides equal distribution of power while negotiating the payoff share. The profit share among firm is calculated using factors such as learning, trust, knowledge investment, knowledge stock, collaboration level and coordination cost ratio.
In the next section, we analyze different scenarios using above equations in order to analyze the effect of different parameters on the payoff share when firms collaborate and also compare our results with the Nash Bargaining approach proposed in [13] .
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section provides detailed analysis of payoff distribution among focal (f ) and partner (p) firms for various comprehensive list of scenarios as shown in the table 3. In this work we adapt the scenarios presented in [13] , which are validated by industrial experts of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) [13] . The adapted scenarios were edited according to our model to reflect the situations such as when the firms should collaborate; whether the firm should develop a product individually or the collaborating partner is not the right choice for collaboration. Furthermore, we also evaluate the impact of knowledge investment, knowledge complementarity, developing a new product or upgrading an existing one when the efficacy level is low or high. In addition, we provide strategies for firms on collaboration formation i.e. whether a firm will get more payoff when it develops a product in collaboration or when it does so individually.
We consider twelve scenarios as shown in Table 3 . In our scenarios, we consider linguistic values such as high, low or moderate for parameters such as trust, knowledge investment, DCDR f , DCDR p knowledge complementarity and product efficacy. Whereas, product type can be new, minimum upgrade or major upgrade. Values of all these parameters are normalized on the scale of 0 to 1. In accordance with the scenarios considered in [13] , for instance, low, moderate and high trust levels are assigned values in the ranges 0.0 or 0.01 to 0.3, 0.31 to 0.6, and 0.6 to 1 respectively. In the figures numbered from 1 to 8, we use radar charts for graphical description of the results; vertical numbers on the radius of a figure represents payoff of the collaboration for firm f and p. Whereas, the outer edges represent the Nash Bargaining, Shapley value approach and firms developing product individually without collaboration.
Consider the first scenario of 3, in which firm p has high trust on firm f , both are collaborating to develop a new product from scratch, their knowledge complementary is high and product efficacy is moderate. We evaluate our algorithm in a similar way under various given scenarios.
A. IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE INVESTMENT
We assess the impact of Knowledge Investment by firms in this section as it is an important factor which influences the payoff of a firm. More, the knowledge investment by both the firms ensures higher collaborative learning and increased profit. In the figure 1, knowledge investment by p is set to high and we vary its value from low to high for f which is represented by (KIF). When KIF = 0, it is costly for f to develop a product individually because it generates negative payoff. A firm having low or none investment cannot benefit from the collaboration even though collaboration may improve its loss or negative payoff, but still, it may bear some of the cost instead of the profit. Such collaboration may not occur for new product development. However, in case of a product upgradation such a collaboration may occur when a firm wants to minimize its loss.
Increase in KIF by f not only enhances the profit generated by the collaboration, but also the individual profit share for both the firms. Collaboration occurs, as profit for both the firms increases when they develop the product collaboratively as compared to doing so individually. However, the partner firm gets more profit share when it invests higher but with increase in investment by focal firm both firms get equal share of the profit.
Our model suggests that the collaboration may not occur if f makes low knowledge investment, and both the firms have low DCDR. Low DCDR gives negative payoffs to both when they develop a product without collaboration no matter knowledge investment of firms is high or low because the gain from developing a product is less compared to the cost a firm puts in developing it. However, as shown in the figure 2, it is profitable for both the firms to develop the product collaboratively when both make high knowledge investment. The profit that they get is better than the Nash Bargaining solution [13] which suggests that with low DCDR, and low or high investment by both the firms the payoffs that both get is negative. Therefore, our model suggests that with low investments by f the collaboration may not form but with the increase in KIF, the firm f gets positive payoffs as a result of which alliance may form. In the figure 3 , we evaluate the impact of KIF by f on the payoffs; the value of DCDR for f and p is set to high and low respectively. Results show that a collaboration may only occur when KI by both is high. Because of high DCDR of f , it gets more payoff even when KI by both partners is high. On the other hand, when f makes low KI, and has higher DCDR than p, the collaboration may not occur because p gets a negative payoff. It is to be noted that as per the properties of our cooperative game model, the firms get at least the payoff in collaboration that they would earn if they develop the product individually, but in both the cases their payoff is negative; a business firm would neither like to develop a product individually or collaboratively that results in a loss; a lesser loss to both in collaboration would not change their decision. On the other hand, almost similar results is obtained from the Nash Bargaining solution [13] where firms may collaborate when the knowledge investment of both the firms is high.
B. IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE COMPLEMENTARITY
Knowledge complementarity is the amount of difference between the knowledge of f and p. Varying only knowledge complementarity affects the total profit as shown in the figure 4, but the decision on the overall profit sharing ratio remains the same which is that firms should equally divide the payoff between them. No matter what the knowledge complementarity level is, if the contributions by both the firms are equal and high in their other capabilities, a collaboration may occur and greater payoffs will be achieved by forming coalition. In accordance with [13] , as the knowledge complementarity between firms increases, the payoff to both decreases due to the reason that a firm does not possess enough capability to gain knowledge from another firm and utilize it in the project.
Results in the figure 5 show a behavior similar to those in figure 4 where the total payoff decreases with increase in the knowledge complementarity of firms. However, in the figure 5 every scenario suggests that f gets more share of the profit due to high knowledge investment by p. Whereas, Nash solution also suggests a similar behavior where p gets more profit share than f irrespective of whether the knowledge complementarity is high or low.
In the figure 6 , the knowledge investment by p is set higher, whereas, the initial development cost of f is set higher and we vary their knowledge complementarity. As can be seen, f with low investment and high initial DC gets a negative payoff when it develops the product without collaboration. On the other hand, collaboration with partner firm gives positive share of the profit to f , but with high knowledge complementarity f gets a negative payoff even if both firms collaborate. In such a situation, the collaboration may not occur or may occur only if a firm wants to decrease its negative payoff that it gets while developing its product without collaborating. In this situation, the partner firm gets more and positive payoff regardless of the knowledge complementarity level between both the firms.
C. IMPACT OF EFFICACY ON DEVELOPING A NEW PRODUCT AND UP-GRADATION
New product provides more benefits compared to product upgradation. Figure 7 and 8 illustrate the payoffs for both f and p when they develop a new product and upgrade it for both the cases when they do so: a) individually without collaboration, and b) in collaboration. As shown in figure 8 , both the firms get low payoffs when they collaborate for a minimum upgradation of an existing product. This is because the value addition by them is lesser than their coordination cost and the investment they put in upgrading the product jointly. On the other hand, the firms get better payoffs when they collaborate to develop a new product or for a major up-gradation. Our model suggests that collaboration may not occur if the firms with low DCDR develop a product individually. Even though both firms gets a better payoff if they collaborate, but the negative payoff to both firms will restrict firms to collaborate to avid loss in business. However, if both partners have high DCDR, they may get a better payoff when they collaborate to develop a new product or for a major up-gradation. Furthermore, in figures numbered 7 and 8, all the parameters of the firms are kept the same except for the product type. Results in both the said figures satisfy the axioms of Shapley value i.e. player with equal contribution gets equal payoffs.
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In this section, summary of the scenarios given in the table 3 is presented. Fair profit sharing mechanism allows firms to VOLUME 7, 2019 decide whether to collaborate while developing a product do so individually. However, several strategies can be proposed depending upon the situation the firms are in. For instance, a firm might be interested in seeking a partner either to develop a new product or for a major upgrade of an existing one. Two strategies emerged for the decision of whether to collaboration or not based on the profit share each firm gets after collaboration. These strategies can be summarized as
• Collaborate (C): Collaboration provides high profit therefore forming alliance is a win-win decision
• Not Collaborate (NC): Firm should not collaborate when developing new product. As collaboration may provide added profit but still collaboration may cost one or both firm rather than profit. Tables numbered 4, 5 and 6 show the better strategies based on the profit each firm gets during each of the twelve scenarios we have evaluated earlier in this section. Consider the scenario 1 where the knowledge investment by f i.e. KIF is zero. As shown in the table 4, not forming collaboration (NC) is the best strategy for f , although it gets a better payoff due to collaboration as shown in 1 but still not enough for the firm to form collaboration. Whereas, for the partner firm collaboration creates profit but in new product development collaboration may only occur when firms get positive share of the profit. However, if the focal firm's investment (KIF = 0.5) or (KIF = 1) for both firms the best choice for both firm is to collaborate (C) as both firm get positive payoff from the collaboration.
In scenario 2, where knowledge investment by focal low (KIF = 0) or moderate (KIF = 0.5) the best choice for both firm is not to form collaboration due to negative payoffs even after collaboration as shown in figure 2 whereas with high knowledge investment (KIF = 1) by both firms the choice of collaboration changes from not collaborating (NC) to collaborate (C). Scenario 3, present similar behavior to scenario 2 where low (KIF = 0) or moderate (KIF = 0.5) knowledge investment by focal firm leads to not collaboration where as high knowledge (KIF = 1) investment by focal firm leads to collaboration.
In scenario 4, where the knowledge complementarity among firm is varied both firm get high profit when they have high DCDR rate regardless of any variation in knowledge complementarity among firms. Therefore, the best choice for both firm is to collaborate (C) for each knowledge complementarity variation. Scenario 5 shows similar behavior to scenario 4 where both firms get positive payoff from the collaboration as shown in figure 4 and 5. The best choice for both firms in each collaboration is in scenario 5 is to form collaboration. In scenario 6 best choice for both firm is to collaborate with low (β = 0) or moderate (β = 0.5) knowledge complementarity. Whereas our model suggest that collaboration is not the best choice in scenario 6.
Different behavior can be experienced in scenario 7 to 12 results as shown in figure 7 and 8. With low efficacy or high efficacy for new product development not collaboration (NC) is the best choice. Whereas, low efficacy with major up-gradation provide negative payoff for firms even after collaboration therefore best choice for both firms is to not to collaborate (NC). Furthermore, major up-gradation with high efficacy also provides negative payoffs to both firm therefore best choice for both firms is to not collaborate (NC). Minor up-gradation of product with low or high efficacy also suggest strategy of not collaborate (NC) rather than collaboration as both firms still achieve negative payoff even after forming collaboration. Hence, with given inputs all scenarios leads to a not collaboration strategy either the product is new or its an upgradation.
V. CONCLUSION
Selection of an appropriate partner plays a significant role in developing quality software products collaboratively and enhance payoff to firms. Existing one-way partner selection techniques are not realistic as they rank potential partner firms from the perspective of a single firm neglecting the fact that the best selected firm for collaboration may not form alliance with it. This limitation is solved by two-way partner selection techniques as they consider various parameters of both the firms for collaboration formation like criteria for sharing profit, resources and coordination costs. However, total payoff generated due to collaboration formation may be low and its distribution among partner firms may also be unfair due to limitation of bargain problem in existing approaches; the bargaining power in game theoretic approaches may provide advantage to the first mover to get more profit resulting in unfair profit distribution.
In this work, with the aim to enhance the total payoff generated by an alliance and to offer its fair distribution to partnering firms, we formulated the strategic interaction between them for collaboration formation and profit sharing as a Shapley value based cooperative game. Our model offers equal bargaining power to partnering firms and offers fair distribution to them based on their individual contributions. Although, collaborative development adds value to the product [13] , but not every alliance ends in a success. The proposed model provides a decision support system for the project managers to select an appropriate partner for a successful alliance. It suggests strategies for collaboration formation to the firms for the numerous scenarios presented in the table 3. Firms should not collaborate (NC) when both get negative payoffs even after collaboration. Similarly, firms should collaborate (C) if the payoff share from alliance for both firms is positive. However, in minor product update with a low or high efficacy, the model suggests that firms should not collaborate (NC) when their DCDR rate is low. On the other hand, a better payoff can be achieved when the collaborate with a firm having High DCDR and all other parameters are high.
In our future work, we plan to test the effectiveness of our model with a real data set of the industry. In addition, we plan to assess the effectiveness of our n-player collaboration formation model as shown in the appendix B and also provide stable alliance formation strategies.
Considering above equation we wrote value of the product and added value of the product in a compact way such as x = x + y( 
Learning of a firm j not only depend on firms absorption capacity function (KI j i , β) but it also depend that on the knowledge investment by all collaborating firms KI j i and the trust that all other firms have on firm j. In alliance the knowledge stock of all firm can be used while developing product. Therefore, the pooled stock of knowledge for N players collaboration will be
Pooled stock of knowledge is utilized by all collaborating firms to develop product value and minimize their development cost by using the expertise of other firm and generate profit alliance. For N players, the total joint payoff function will be then 
Deriving the optimal level of collaboration for the joint profit maximization of n-players from the total payoff function by taking first order derivative and setting it to 0. The From the above equation, we will get the real payoff then applying cooperative game theoretic approach such as Shapley value to decide the share of payoff among N firms according to their marginal contribution. Where N = (1, 2, 3 , . . . n), following is the Shapley value equation for n-player payoff distribution. 
